The Impact of Taiwan\u27s Political Reform on Its Mainland China Policy: Pragmatic Economic Relations and Conflicting Political Ideology by Weiner, Lawrence B.
Washington International Law Journal 
Volume 0 
Number 1 Intramural Issue 
5-1-1992 
The Impact of Taiwan's Political Reform on Its Mainland China 
Policy: Pragmatic Economic Relations and Conflicting Political 
Ideology 
Lawrence B. Weiner 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lawrence B. Weiner, Comment, The Impact of Taiwan's Political Reform on Its Mainland China Policy: 
Pragmatic Economic Relations and Conflicting Political Ideology, 0 Wash. L. Rev. 27 (1992). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wilj/vol0/iss1/4 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington International Law Journal by an authorized editor of UW 
Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
Copyright 0 1991, Lawrence E. Weiner
The Impact of Taiwan's Political Reform on
Its Mainland China Policy: Pragmatic




For nearly forty years, the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC),
acting under the Kuo Min Tang (KMT), or Nationalist Party, and the
People's Republic of China (PRC), acting under the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP), have ruled separate provinces across the Taiwan Straits,
each claiming legitimate rule over China. During that entire time, neither
side rescinded its threat to use military force, and the mainland regularly
shelled islands controlled by the ROC.
Recent events, however, have significantly altered relations between
the two Chinas. In 1987, immediately after the ROC government
repealed martial law,' Taiwan residents were allowed to visit the main-
land for the first time. At about the same time, the ROC loosened restric-
tions on private business transactions and began to encourage academic
and cultural exchange across the Straits. The result has been a significant
improvement in private, unofficial relations between Taiwan and main-
land China.
This Comment analyzes two recent changes in ROC policy toward
mainland China. First, despite its ideology, the ROC has adopted a more
pragmatic approach to its colossal neighbor. This approach is embodied
in a "noninterference" doctrine which allows Taiwan residents to engage
in private, unofficial dealings with mainland Chinese, but forbids official,
public contacts. Second, the ROC has begun to exploit academic, cultural
t B.A. 1982, Yale University; J.D. Candidate 1992, The University of Washington.
1. Martial law was formally lifted on July 15, 1987, soon after the National Security Act
was passed by the Legislative Yuan.
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and economic exchange across the Straits in an effort to convince main-
landers of the superiority of the ROC system over communism. This
claim, that Taiwan is a blueprint for the mainland, represents a battle for
the hearts and minds of Chinese people. It is also the ROC's last realistic
hope that it represents the future path of China.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Orthodoxy as a Basis for the ROC's Refusal to Negotiate
Ever since the KMT and its followers fled the mainland for Taiwan
in 1949, its leaders have clung to the belief that the government they
established on Taiwan is the one legitimate government of China. In this
respect, the ROC is not unlike many regimes throughout Chinese history.
Historically, China's leaders have gone to great lengths to establish their
legitimacy by demonstrating their allegiance to traditional Chinese moral,
social and political precepts. Leaders who could prove their orthodoxy
were able to justify their own authority and discredit the opposition; this
notion is evident in the adage han zei bu lian li [all those who are not
orthodox are incompatible].2
Politically, however, neither the ROC nor the PRC can claim to be
orthodox. Prior to 1911, China was a dynastic, pre-modern society lack-
ing experience with republican government. Since both the ROC and
PRC are republics, Chinese history does not provide useful political mod-
els for contemporary leadership. Moreover, both parties were heavily
influenced by Soviet doctrine and methods.' Although some argue that
Sun Yat-sen's doctrine is inherently more "Chinese" than Marxist-Maoist
ideology, such assertions are difficult to prove, and in any event both par-
ties profess to revere Dr. Sun. In some respects, the ROC has moved
further away from Chinese political tradition than the PRC: the current
process of democratization in Taiwan is unprecedented in Chinese his-
tory. The Communists, on the other hand, seem to have embraced the
time-worn Confucian concepts of thought-control and authoritarianism.4
The KMT therefore gives "orthodoxy" a more ethical and cultural
meaning than a political one. Chiang Kai-shek once wrote: "We must
2. Zeng Xianyi and Zheng Ding, Current Special Laws in Taiwan as an Impediment to the
Development of Relations with the PRC, 3 J Chinese L 204, 208 (1989).
3. See John King Fairbank, The Great Chinese Revolution 1800-1985 ch 12 (Harper &
Row, 1987).
4. The Confucianist Dong Zhongshu claimed that a "unified dominion" requires unity of
politics and of people's thought. Zeng and Zheng, 3 J Chinese L at 209 (cited in note 2).
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carry forward ethical standards that emphasize etiquette and justice and a
sense of honor. This system of ethics is the siwei bade [four relations,
eight virtues] which is based on loyalty and piety."5 This Confucian sys-
tem influenced early 20th-century KMT leaders and became rooted in
present-day Taiwan society.
The ROC's claim to orthodoxy is that the political leaders of Taiwan,
and not those on the mainland, have gone to great lengths to uphold
traditional Chinese values, especially those pertaining to the Confucian
model for social relations, and have preserved, interpreted, and integrated
these values into the institutional norms of family, school, and govern-
ment.6 This claim is credible because the ROC has not altered the written
language, has preserved traditional educational goals and methods, has
encouraged the celebration of traditional events, and has generally
revered the "old culture."7 In the hands of the political authorities on
Taiwan, this cultural orthodoxy has become a powerful propaganda tool
to win the hearts and minds of Chinese people.
B. Special Laws
The current ROC Constitution was enacted on December 25, 1946
and became effective one year after its enactment. This constitution,
based on the teachings of Sun Yat-sen, is guided by the principle that a
government is created by a constitution, that powers are separated and
balanced, and that the president's powers should be limited.' It contains
provisions which guarantee citizens' rights similar to those found in West-
ern constitutions, such as freedom of speech and publication, 9 religious
belief,1 0 residence,11 privacy of correspondence,12 assembly and associa-
tion. 3 It also states that people are all equal before the law irrespective of
sex, race, religion, class or party affiliations.
1 4
5. Id at 208.
6. William T. Liu, Sociocultural Relations, 16 Asian Affairs 135, 138 (1989).
7. This assertion of orthodoxy is generally undisputed, even among mainland Chinese
interpreters.
8. Hung-mao Tien, The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the ROC 245
(Hoover Institution Press, 1989) ("The Great Transition").
9. ROC Const, Art 11.
10. Id at Art 13.
11. Id at Art 10.
12. Id at Art 12.
13. Id at Art 14.
14. Id at Art 7.
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At the time this constitution came into effect, however, the KMT
was engaged in armed struggle with the Chinese Communists for control
of the mainland. During this time, it would have been difficult if not
impossible to conduct the government in accord with the constitution. As
a result, a series of special laws and regulations were enacted for the pur-
pose of resisting the Japanese and suppressing the Communist Party.'"
Of these laws, the two that were most instrumental in circumventing the
constitution and imposing authoritarian rule were (1) the Temporary Pro-
visions Effective During the Period of Mobilization to Suppress Commu-
nist Rebellion and (2) Martial Law.
1. The Temporary Provisions
When the first session of the first term of the National Assembly was
convened at Nanking in 1948, the Temporary Provisions Effective During
the Period of Mobilization to Suppress Communist Rebellion ("Tempo-
rary Provisions") were adopted to deal with the emergency created by the
Chinese Communists' military successes. These provisions have been in
force since 1949, when the Communists overran the mainland and the
KMT and its supporters fled to Taiwan.
Although the Temporary Provisions are not "formal" amendments
to the constitution, they have suspended many of its key provisions.
16
Essentially, the provisions deem the Communists "rebels" and legally
empower the ROC government to act at its own discretion to "avert
imminent danger" or "cope with any serious economic crisis." 17 They
override the constitution by giving the president extra-constitutional pow-
15. More than thirty such laws and regulations creating special crimes and punishments
existed before 1947, and since then more than thirty similar laws and regulations have been
promulgated. In 1927, a special criminal law was enacted called the Interim Regulations for
Suppressing Bandits. Other laws which were later adopted include the Interim Penal Law for
Counterrevolutionary Crimes, the Emergency Penal Law for Endangering the Republic, the Law
Concerning Voluntary Surrender of Members of the Communist Party, Interim Procedures for
the Punishment of Bandits, and the Emergency Procedures Concerning the Safeguarding of
Social Order During Periods of Rebellion. See Zeng and Zheng, 3 J Chinese L at 211 (cited in
note 2).
16. The procedure to amend the constitution can take either of the following forms: (1) An
amendment may be adopted upon the the proposal of one-fifth of the total number of delegates to
the National Assembly and by a resolution of three-fourths of the delegates present at a meeting
with a quorum of two-thirds of all delegates; or (2) an amendment may be drawn up by the
Legislative Yuan and submitted by it to the National Assembly for concurrence through
referendum upon the proposal of one-fourth of the members of the Legislative Yuan and by a
resolution of three-fourths of all members of the Yuan. ROC Const, Art 174. In fact, the
adoption of the Temporary Provisions followed the procedures prescribed for amendments to the
constitution.
17. ROC Const, Temporary Provisions, Art 1.
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ers to deal with political, military, and economic matters during times of
emergency. They also extend the president's term indefinitely, authorize
him to establish special organizations without constitutional restriction,
and invalidate the constitutional requirement that all representatives be
elected. 1
8
Under the extra-constitutional powers conferred by the Temporary
Provisions, the president has nearly unlimited authority to avert crisis.
Moreover, the Temporary Provisions have legally justified the enactment
of many special laws and regulations. As a result, the government has
passed laws which both (a) extend the scope of application of civil and
criminal law and (b) increase the penalties for various crimes beyond
those set by statute.19 Regulations have been enacted which raise fines for
criminal and civil offenses,2" increase penalties for drug smuggling2 1 and
embezzling,22 change electoral procedure,23 and stiffen penalties for "ban-
dits" (i.e., Communists).24 These special laws and regulations have ena-
bled the ROC government to strictly control Taiwan society for decades.
2. Marfial Law
Martial law was enacted on the mainland in 1934, but it was not
until May 20, 1949 that it was extended to Taiwan.2" Its application was
based on an administrative order issued in December 1949 by the Execu-
tive Yuan that designated Taiwan a combat area in China's civil war.
2 6
From then until July 15, 1987, Taiwan was under military control, even
though the island has never been a combat area.
18. Id at Arts 4-5. As a result of this provision, the National Security Conference was
created. In times of emergency, the NSC acts independently of the Five Departments of the
central government. The Great Transition at 253 (cited in note 8).
19. Zeng and Zheng, 3 J Chinese L at 215 (cited in note 2).
20. Regulations for Raising the Amounts of Fines During the Suppression of Rebellion,
promulgated May 25, 1962; amended Jan. 9, 1970. 18 Compilation of Current Laws and
Regulations of the ROC 10833.
21. Regulations Concerning Elimination of Drugs During Time of Rebellion, promulgated
June 3, 1955; amended June 21, 1973. 34 Compilation of Current Laws and Regulations of the
ROC 20265.
22. Regulations for Inflicting Punishments on Embezzlers During Time of Rebellion,
promulgated July 15, 1963; amended June 21, 1973. Id.
23. Law for Election and Removal of Government Officials During Time of Rebellion,
promulgated May 14, 1980; amended July 8, 1983. 2 Current Compilation of Laws and
Regulations of the ROC 765.
24. Regulations for Informing Against Bandits and Espionage During Time of Rebellion,
promulgated June 13, 1950; amended Dec. 28, 1954. 12 Compilation of Current Laws and
Regulations of the ROC 6911.
25. Martial Law, promulgated Nov 29, 1934; amended 1949; repealed July 15, 1987.
26. The Great Transition at 110 (cited in note 8).
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Under Article 9 of the law, "local adminstrative and judicial mat-
ters" throughout Taiwan were to be placed "under the jurisdiction of the
commander in chief," and local administrative officials and judges were to
be "subject to the direction of the said commander in chief."2 7 In 1950, a
Taiwan Garrison Command headquarters was established to supervise all
matters regarding the implementation of martial law.28 Although it did
not assume control of local administrative and judicial matters as stipu-
lated in Article 9, its responsibilities did include (a) authorizing citizens to
travel abroad, (b) monitoring all entries into Taiwan, (c) approving meet-
ings and rallies, (d) reviewing and sanctioning books and periodicals, and
(e) maintaining social order.2 9 As a result, military authority governed a
broad segment of civilian life.
Some commentators, especially those from the ruling KMT party,
have argued that martial law did not significantly alter the structure and
function of constitutional government.3" They point to the fact that many
provisions of martial law were not implemented, and that day-to-day life
was relatively unaffected.31 Nevertheless, the Garrison Command held
tremendous extra-constitutional power over Taiwan's citizens. People
were subject to restrictions and surveillance categorically forbidden by the
constitution.32 Organized political opposition was banned, and all
contact with the mainland was forbidden. For many Chinese in Taiwan
and overseas, martial law symbolized political oppression and
authoritarianism.
C. Mainland Policy
No matter what circumstances it finds itself in, the Republic of
China will never negotiate with the communist government, nor
will it ever abandon its divine mission of saving its fellow coun-
27. Martial Law at Art 9 (cited in note 25).
28. The Great Transition at 110 (cited in note 8).
29. Id.
30. Dennis Te-Chung Tang, On the Feasibility of Economic Incentives in Taiwan's
Environmental Regulations: Lessons from the American Experience 299 (December 1990)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal).
31. In a poll conducted in Taiwan in 1985, many people said they did not even know of the
existence of martial law. Id.
32. The Great Transition at 111 (cited in note 8).
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trymen and restoring the mainland. Our position will never
change. 3
Since 1949, the ROC has considered the "Three No's" to be the cen-
terpiece of its mainland policy: no contact, no negotiations, and no com-
promise. Until the early eighties, this policy was synonymous with
absolute separation.
It is important to remember that in spite of the conflict between the
two rival governments, both sides officially agree that there is only one
China, and that Taiwan is merely a province within China. The problem
is that both the PRC and ROC each insist that it alone is the legitimate
national government. To the PRC, the ROC government is a provincial
authority, with legitimate rule over the province of Taiwan only. To the
contrary, the ROC asserts that it is a "provisional" government which is
biding its time on Taiwan until it can one day retake the mainland.
Until recently, ROC policy towards the mainland has been uniformly
characterized by extreme hostility and absolute separation.34 This
approach was justified, among other reasons, by a hardline PRC stance,
which held that Taiwan was an enclave of dictatorial "bureaucrats, land-
lords, and big bourgeoisie" who were, according to Marxist-Leninist ide-
ology, exploiters and oppressers of the masses.3 5 Throughout the 1960's
and 70's, Beijing advocated a military solution and deployed troops along
the Fukien coast poised to "liberate" Taiwan.3 6 In 1976, for example,
Zhang Chunqiao, one of the group later labelled the "Gang of Four," told
a U.S. delegation that peaceful reconciliation was impossible, and that
Taiwan must be "liberated by force."37 Although there are examples of
pragmatic mainland officials who advocated peaceful reunification, 38 Tai-
wan had every reason to be cautious.
Another factor which influenced Taiwan's mainland policy was the
legitimacy of the KMT regime, which was founded on the principle of
China's unification. After the KMT sought sanctuary on Taiwan in 1949,
it dominated the political process on the island, claiming that its refugee
33. Chiang Ching-kuo in a 1978 address before the National Assembly. See Jason C. Hu,
The Policy of the Republic of China Towards the Mainland, 25 Asian Outlook 20 (May-June
1990).
34. Hu, 25 Asian Outlook at 20 (cited in note 33).
35. The Great Transition at 240 (cited in note 8).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. As early as 1956, Chou En-lai stated that "the Chinese people would seek to liberate
Taiwan by peaceful means so far as it is possible." Id.
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regime was still China's only legitimate government. The KMT claimed
that the Chinese civil war had not ended, and that Beijing's rulers were
"communist bandits." They vowed to counterattack the mainland.39
Before 1979, mainland Chinese units regularly shelled ROC-
controlled offshore islands, and the two sides were in a constant state of
military confrontation ranging from military action to subversive infiltra-
tion." As a result, the ROC at times spent more than half its national
budget on its armed forces and had made plans to recapture the mainland
militarily.4
1
Military force was not used, however, and the battle for legitimacy
became a battle of diplomacy, with foreign nations as de facto arbiters.
This battle went poorly for Taiwan, and the ROC suffered a serious set-
back in 1971 when the United Nations voted to admit the Beijing govern-
ment.42 In 1978, President Carter officially recognized the PRC, broke
off official relations with Taiwan, abrogated the Mutual Defense Treaty,
and began withdrawing the U.S. military presence from the island.43 For
both Taiwan and the mainland, this was a turning point.
It was then that the ROC government began to take a more sober
look at its relations with the mainland. Although old-guard KMT main-
landers still dominated national government and ardently supported mili-
tary recapture of the mainland, many officials, Chiang Ching-kuo among
them, realized that Taiwan had grown increasingly isolated in the world
community and could no longer depend on U.S. or Soviet intervention if
the mainland attacked militarily. This realization did not change Taipei's
-official policy, but a subtle change had occurred. Officials began to
acknowledge that a new strategy was needed.
Concurrently, as a result of both its own internal politics and its
increased international status, the PRC advanced a series of peaceful
overtures aimed at pushing the reunification process forward.' Their
stance differed markedly from the bellicose rhetoric of the three preceding
decades: on January 1, 1979, the same day it established diplomatic rela-
39. F. Gilbert Chan, China's Reunification and the Taiwan Question 22 (Asian Studies
Monograph Series, Asian Research Service, 1984) ("China's Reunification").
40. Ricky Tung, Mainland China in Taiwan's Economic Future, 26 Issues & Studies 37, 40
(May 1990).
41. Id at 37.
42. China's Reunification at 23 (cited in note 39).
43. Id at 19.
44. In December 1978, after Deng Xiaoping and his associates won their power struggle
against the Maoists, the new CCP leadership decided that the struggle for reunification should be
pursued by peaceful means.
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tions with Washington, the PRC issued a "Message to Compatriots in
Taiwan," offering to work with them in pursuit of the "historical mission
of national reunification.""5 Mainland officials urged Taiwan to establish
direct trade, postal/telecommunications, and shipping ties with the main-
land (known as the "three direct ties"), as well as academic, cultural,
sports, and technological exchanges (known as the "four exchanges").4 6
At the same time, it ceased shelling ROC-controlled offshore islands.4 7
The ROC refused to negotiate, and thus no official ties were estab-
lished. But at this time, mainland agencies started making large
purchases of Taiwan consumer goods through Hong Kong. In 1980 the
mainland removed export taxes on products sold to Taiwan and also
removed import duties on Taiwan goods.4 8 Since then, the mainland has
regarded all Taiwan-mainland trade, which was still illegal in Taiwan, as
its own domestic trade.49
II. MAINLAND FEVER
A. Political Reform
The political turning point occurred in October 1986, when Presi-
dent Chiang Ching-kuo announced that in light of social progress, the
government planned to lift martial law.5 ° The rationale, according to
President Chiang, was that the government "must accomodate itself to
the changing environment" and that only by adopting reform measures
would it "be able to keep pace with the changing times."5 1 In July 1987,
the National Security Act During the Period of Communist Rebellion
("National Security Act") formally replaced martial law.
This change dramatically affected relations with the mainland. In
November 1987, Taiwan residents (excepting public officials and army
personnel) were allowed to visit immediate family relatives on the main-
land. In August 1988, regulations were extended to allow Taiwan resi-
dents to visit relatives up to the fourth degree, and in April 1989, teachers
(excepting military and police teachers and principals of universities and
45. China's Reunification at 17 (cited in note 39).
46. Tung, 26 Issues & Studies at 38 (cited in note 40).
47. Id at 39.
48. Id.
49. Although duty-free status was modified a year later to correct abuses by trading agents
in Hong Kong, Taiwan products have continued to enjoy customs rates lower than products
from other countries. The Great Transition at 245 (cited in note 8).
50. Id at 112.
51. Id.
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colleges) were permitted to return to their home villages on the main-
land.52 In May 1989, permission was granted for news reporting and
filmmaking on the mainland, and soon thereafter members of private
organizations were allowed to attend international trade and economic
conferences held on mainland soil.53 Subsequently, regulations were
relaxed even further: permission to travel was granted to employees of
government organizations and state-run enterprises (excluding those in
military, police and intelligence organizations), and in April 1990, elected
officials at all levels were permitted to make private visits.54
According to mainland China's National Tourism Administration,
in 1989, 561,000 people traveled to China from Taiwan, spending $1.4
billion-64.8 percent of the mainland's income from tourism that year."
Although the total number of tourists worldwide who visited the main-
land dropped 7 percent in the first quarter of 1990, those from Taiwan
increased 40 percent from the year before.56  Some claim that over
1,000,000 tourists from Taiwan visited the mainland in 1990.1
7
B. Trade and Investment
In addition to an increase in tourism, there was also a surge in trade
and investment between the two Chinas. Actually, trade had begun to
increase in 1979 after mainland officials announced favorable treatment of
all Taiwan-made products.58 At that time, the ROC deemed all trade
between Taiwan and the mainland illegal on the grounds that any eco-
nomic exchange would "prop up" the Communist regime, and was there-
fore adverse to the ROC's best interest.
Nonetheless, authorities were aware of extensive indirect trade,
mostly through Hong Kong, which had been taking place since 1979.
Although the ROC did not officially sanction such trade, neither did the
52. Masahiro Wakabayashi, Relations Between Taiwan and China During the 1980's
Viewed from the Taiwan Perspective, 87 China Newsletter 7, 8 (July-August 1990).
53. Chronology--Pragmatic Adaptations, Free China Review 15 (January 1991).
54. Id.
55. Chien-min Chao, Interactions Between Taiwan and Mainland China After the
Tiananmen Massacre, 26 Issues & Studies 36, 48 (December 1990).
56. Id.
57. Wakabayashi, 87 China Newsletter at 6 (cited in note 52).
58. In 1980, Taiwan had already become the leading source of Hong Kong's reexports to
the mainland, and has continued to occupy this position until present. Between 1980 and 1984,
trade grew annually by as much as 157 percent-via third-country trading companies, fishing
boats, and the black market. Between 1979 and 1988, trade relations between Taiwan and the
mainland increased at an average rate of 48.5 percent. Tung, 26 Issues & Studies at 40 (cited in
note 40).
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government discourage it. Officials knew that indirect exports had
become a source of significant revenue, and realized that they could not
control private transactions conducted under the guise of third-country
trading companies. At the same time, many believed that Taiwan's eco-
nomic clout could be used to its own advantage. Thus the ROC govern-
ment ignored indirect trade and promulgated no explicit guidelines.
In 1985, this ambiguous policy stance came under attack: a Taiwan
businessman who had visited Guangzhou in connection with an indirect
trade matter was arrested by the Taiwan Garrison Command on his
return to Taiwan.5 9 As a result, industry began to complain loudly, and
the matter became a political problem. In July 1985, the Taiwan govern-
ment announced that it would stand by the principles of "non-interfer-
ence" and "non-encouragement" regarding exports of Taiwan goods via
third countries. 6°
Although ROC authorities adopted a hands-off approach to exports
shipped indirectly to the mainland, imports continued to be subject to
strict controls. Nonetheless, as a result of Taiwan residents' strong
demand for mainland products, business leaders began to pressure the
government to relax restrictions. In July 1987, ROC authorities abol-
ished import controls on raw materials for Chinese medicines, and
approved the import of cultural and scientific publications from the main-
land.61 Since that time, the ROC has approved, with certain restrictions,
the indirect import of coal, raw cotton, steel, cement, various manufactur-
ing and agricultural raw materials and other items.
62
Indirect trade between Taiwan and the mainland continued to grow
after the June 4, 1989 Tiananmen uprising, but not as quickly as before.
ROC officials claim that between 1987 and 1988, trade grew by about 80
percent, while growth between 1988 and 1989 was only about 30 per-
59. Wakabayashi, 87 China Newsletter at 10 (cited in note 52).
60. This doctrine has been worded as a three-point policy:
(1) Taiwan residents are not allowed to trade directly with mainland China;
(2) No direct negotiations are allowed with Communist officials;
(3) The ROC authorities will not interfere with indirect trade, as they are not in a
position to control it.
This policy has been disappointing because it fails to address many vital concerns.
Nonetheless, it is expedient because it (a) maintains the Three No's principle by banning all
official contact, and (b) saves the ROC from enforcing laws which would be difficult, if not
impossible, to enforce.
61. Wakabayashi, 87 China Newsletter at 8 (cited in note 52).
62. Id at 10.
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cent.63 This impact has been attributed to the brutal suppression of the
pro-democracy movement and China's austerity program.' 4
Since the Persian Gulf crisis, however, there has been a significant
increase in indirect trade. Between 1990 and 1991, trade via Hong Kong
rose 76 percent.65 According to ROC trade officials, Taiwan exporters
were unable to sell their products in the Middle East during this time, and
consequently stepped up shipments to China.
Indirect Taiwanese investment in mainland China has also prolifer-
ated. Since 1987, many small and medium-size export processing enter-
prises in Taiwan have established operations on the mainland. There are
several reasons for this: First, Taiwan is in a period of economic transi-
tion. Land prices, wages, and other costs have escalated, and many indus-
tries face obstacles posed by environmental regulations. Taiwan is no
longer a mecca of cheap labor and unlimited resources. Second, many
Taiwan businesspeople have close personal connections on the mainland.
Family ties provide guanxi (connections), a necessity for dealing with the
mainland's multifarious written and unwritten regulations. Third, the
sheer size of the mainland market is difficult to ignore. Fourth, many
Taiwan investors see themselves as free-market prophets, helping trans-
form the Communist regime into a capitalist economy. Last, mainland
authorities have taken significant steps to encourage Taiwanese invest-
ment. In 1989, for instance, the State Council approved the establishment
of exclusive investment zones ("Taiwan Industrial Zones") for Taiwan
businesses in the Haicang and Xinglin regions of coastal Xiamen City.
66
For these reasons, indirect investment from Taiwan has increased
rapidly since 1987. At the end of 1988 there were 430 investment projects
totalling $600 million, and by the end of 1989 there were roughly 2,000
investment projects worth as much as $1.0 billion.67 Most of these
projects were in the mainland's Fujian Province.
Moreover, investment has not seemed to diminish since the
Tiananmen Square massacre. Following the June 4 crackdown, PRC offi-
cials actively reassured Taiwan investors that they would "enjoy full
63. Trade between 1988 and 1989 totaled $3.4 billion. Dennis Van Vranken Hickey,
Tiananmen's Tremors: The Economic, Political, and Strategic Impact of the Democracy
Movement on Taiwan, 27 Issues & Studies 36, 38 (February 1991).
64. Id.
65. Exports to China increased 79 percent, while imports jumped 65 percent. Chao, 26
Issues & Studies at 51 (cited in note 55).
66. Wakabayashi, 87 China Newsletter at 11 (cited in note 52).
67. Renmin Ribao (People's Daily, Intl ed) I (Feb. 5, 1990).
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autonomy over the production, management, sales and other aspects of
their firms," and that they would "even be granted more preferential
terms than [non-Chinese] foreign investors."68 In February 1990, PRC
Premier Li Peng declared that "further efforts, such as raising efficiency,
offering more favorable tax rates and providing more skilled workers and
technicians, should be made to create a better climate for investors from
Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau."'69
Although ROC officials deny it, some sources contend that
Taiwanese investment has actually increased since the suppression of the
democracy movement.7' One Taiwanese newspaper report71 claims that
Taiwan is the largest investor on the mainland, with invested capital
exceeding combined Japanese and American investment. In fact, observ-
ers have suggested that Taiwanese investment accounts for as much as 60
percent of all foreign investment on the mainland.72
III. PRAGMATIC ECONOMIC RELATIONS
A. Ad Hoc Approach
This "mainland fever" in the Taiwan business community has pro-
voked anxiety in ROC authorities. Unlike tourism, trade and investment
require official action and raise national security concerns. Nonetheless,
ideology has hindered the ROC: since it does not recognize the mainland
government, it refuses to negotiate with mainland officials. As a result, it
must address trade and related issues in a unilateral and ad hoc fashion.
With regard to imports, ROC officials feared that Taiwan would
become dependent on mainland resources and that the Communist
regime would exploit this advantage. As a result, until 1987 ROC author-
ities banned the import of any good from the mainland. However, since
the mainland was abundant in natural resources well-suited to Taiwan
(such as herbal medicines, coal and cotton), there was significant demand
in Taiwan for mainland products. As a result, the ROC authorities
68. Hickey, 27 Issues & Studies at 45 (cited in note 63).
69. Mainland Welcomes Taiwan Investors, China Daily (Taipei) 1 (February 28, 1990).
70. ROC officials deny that there has been an increase. The director of the Government
Informaion Office, Dr. Shaw Yu-ming, has described Taiwanese investment in the mainland as
"peanuts." Hickey, 27 Issues & Studies at 43 (cited in note 63).
71. Taiwan Becomes Premier Investor on Mainland, China News (Taipei) 4 (February 13,
1990).
72. Lincoln Kaye, Business Booms Across the Taiwan Strait, Far Eastern Economic Review
68 (November 16, 1989).
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granted permission to import certain raw materials in 1987, but stipulated
four conditions which had to be met.73
Since imports must enter the island, they can be strictly monitored,
and have thus not caused significant policy problems. Exports and invest-
ment, on the other hand, have caused alarm among ROC officials. Since
the direct export of any good to the mainland is illegal, exports must first
be sent to third-country destinations such as Hong Kong. Similarly, all
investment must be conducted by third-country subsidiaries. This policy
prevents the government from monitoring or regulating products destined
for the mainland.
A much bigger problem derives from the nature of business: since
goods, equipment, personnel, funds, and information must be exchanged,
there is an urgent need for open lines of transportation and communica-
tion. Yet ROC policy forbids direct airline flights, ship crossings, mail or
telecommunications links, since such contact would require negotiations
between ROC and PRC officials. As a result, Taiwan residents who do
business in mainland China must incur considerable inconvenience and
expense. They must also bear the burden of acting without their govern-
ment's full support and protection.
Consequently, ROC officials admit there is a pressing need for a
more comprehensive approach. The volume of private exchanges between
the two regions is so great that many issues can no longer be ignored. But
officials are also concerned that they are being "dragged along" by the
private sector, meaning that they are being forced to deal with the main-
land as a result of political pressure from powerful industrialists.
The heart of the matter, however, is essentially ideological: ROC
policymakers are hindered by the Three No's policy, which prohibits any
official contact whatsoever with the mainland. As a result, they must deal
with problems arising from private exchanges on an ad hoc basis, without
well-reasoned, comprehehensive, and realistic guidelines. As stated by
Ma Ying-jeou, supervisor of the Foundation for Exchanges Across the
Taiwan Straits: "Our mainland policy has developed to a point where
many problems have arisen as a result of the very extensive contacts
between the people of the two sides. And to be pragmatic, to be problem-
73. The four conditions are: (1) No harm is done to state security; (2) there is no adverse
effect on related domestic industries; (3) such imports contribute to the export competitiveness of
products made in Taiwan; and (4) a warning system be put in place to prevent Taiwan from
becoming too dependent on specific products made in mainland China. Wakabayashi, 87 China
Newsletter at 10 (cited in note 52).
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solving, we have to face the realities and try to solve these problems as
they come up" (emphasis added).74 Although rooted in pragmatism, such
an approach is unrealistic in the long run.
B. Industry Pressure
Trade is a way in which we can strengthen our relations with
the mainland. But if the government does not act quickly to
develop clearer guidelines, businessmen here will unite with the
mainland regime, because such contacts will benefit both of
them.75
Since the opening up of Taiwan in 1987, officials have been con-
cerned about the possibility that industry would pressure the government
into concessions that would ultimately compromise Taiwan's security and
economic development. As a way of illustrating the possible dangers,
ROC President Lee Teng-hui related the following story to a meeting of
the KMT's Central Standing Committee on August 24, 1988:
When the Chinese communists were trying to establish formal
relationships with Japan, they tried everything possible to
encourage Japanese businessmen to invest in mainland China.
Then they told the Japanese that formal diplomatic ties between
the ROC and Japan was the greatest obstacle to the progress of
Japan-mainland China trade, so that the businessmen would put
pressure on their government to sever formal diplomatic rela-
tions with the ROC. Today, we must be careful that the commu-
nists may be doing the same thing. First, they attract our
businessmen to invest on the mainland, and then when invest-
ment becomes substantial, they use our businessmen to put pres-
sure on our government and create problems for us .... We
must look at this possibility with a responsible attitude and we
must prevent it from happening.76
Although this political threat is real, it has been overshadowed by
another looming concern: the shift of large industrial concerns from Tai-
wan to the mainland. Since 1987, ROC officials have been concerned that
(a) investments by Taiwan companies in down-stream, labor-intensive
industries on the mainland would be followed by investments in mid-
stream and upstream, capital-intensive sectors; (b) technology would be
74. Symposium, Adjustments in Policies, Free China Review 1 (January 1991).
75. Kao Koong-lian, deputy executive secretary, Mainland Affairs Council. Id.
76. Hu, 25 Asian Outlook at 24 (cited in note 33).
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transferred which would adversely affect Taiwan's industrial competitive-
ness; and (c) Taiwan's manufacturing industry would be reduced to a
mere shell, through the same process that caused the shift of Hong
Kong's industrial base to the Zhujiang (Pearl River) delta."
In fact, Taiwan's worst fears were realized when the Formosa Plas-
tics Group (FPG), one of the world's largest petrochemical companies,
tentatively agreed to invest up to $7 billion in the Taiwan Industrial Zone
of Xiamen City, Fujian Province, in mainland China. The project would
supply third-tier processing plants with raw materials and would include
an oil refinery, two naphtha crackers, and 32 chemical-refining plants.7 8
If the project were to get off the ground, it would employ up to one mil-
lion mainland Chinese and would make Xiamen a world-class industrial
center. Furthermore, FPG chief Wang Yung-ching, Taiwan's biggest
industrialist and a highly prominent business leader, would set a prece-
dent which others would be sure to follow.
7 9
The government has argued that such an investment would "prop
up" the Communist regime and may pose a threat to Taiwan's industrial
base.8 ° The petrochemical industry accounts for 37 percent of Taiwan's
total production, employs 740,000 people, and exports products worth
$10 billion." If the Fujian project succeeds, the resulting concentration
of mid- and downstream Taiwanese petrochemical manufacturers in
Xiamen city would shift an entire industry to the mainland. Other indus-
tries, including machinery, steel processing, and textiles, would also con-
sider following suit.
8 2
Investors have a different viewpoint. They argue that Taiwan invest-
ment in the mainland encourages economic reform and that strengthening
the mainland's free-market economy is the best way to influence political
reform in the post-Deng era. Nevertheless, a deal as large and influential
as the Formosa Plastics Group project accentuates the conflict between
the business community's basic desire to maximize profits and the govern-
77. Wakabayashi, 87 China Newsletter at 10 (cited in note 52).
78. James MacGregor, Headstrong Tycoon Defies Taiwan, Pursues Huge China Investment
Plan, Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly 11 (August 20, 1990).
79. Id.
80. High-ranking officials are reported to have said that the deal would "lead to the demise
of the industry in Taiwan," and that "the company is supporting the Communist Party." Nan
Min, The Shock of Wang Yung-ch'ing's Mainland Travels, Chiu Shih Nien Tai 38-39 (March
1990).
81. Tung, 26 Issues & Studies at 54 (cited in note 40).
82. Id.
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ment's desire to maintain security and strengthen its political bargaining
position.
C. Difficulty of Monitoring Indirect Business
Although ROC authorities have publicly acknowledged that they
cannot control indirect trade and investment, the Formosa Plastics Group
incident has spurred suggestions to monitor mainland investments made
by publicly-held companies.8 3 This has been difficult, since investments
made by companies in third countries are under foreign jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, in October 1990, the Taiwan Department of Trade and
Industry for the first time approved regulations governing indirect invest-
ments on the mainland, including a list of 3,353 products that could be
produced there.8 4 These rules have rightly been regarded by investors as
an attempt to keep tabs on their foreign activities and have been largely
ignored. So far only a few companies have complied. 5
The ambiguous official policy literally forces Taiwan business to skirt
the law. Businesspeople are expected to conduct "indirect" trade and
investment, which means that when they visit the mainland, they must
wear the "hat" of their foreign subsidiary or trading partner. For exam-
ple, when the chairman of the Formosa Plastics Group, Wang Yung-
ching, traveled to the mainland for negotiations, he met with the gover-
nors of both Guangdong and Fujian Provinces for the express purpose of
doing business. At the end of 1989, he also visited Beijing, where he met
with Deng Xiaoping.86 These meetings, however, were not conducted
under the official name of the Formosa Plastics Group; a subsidiary trad-
ing company had been established in Hong Kong to make sure the ven-
ture was properly "indirect."
The question thus arises whether an official ban on direct trade and
investment is in Taiwan's best interest. The ROC authorities wish to
monitor trade and investment to protect Taiwan's "security and economic
development." 87 But is it possible to monitor indirect trade and invest-
ment? Are not these two policy goals, the ban on direct trade and invest-
ment, and the desire to monitor such activity, contradictory per se?
83. Wakabayashi, 87 China Newsletter at 12 (cited in note 52).
84. Jeremy Mark, Executives Focus on Shortcomings of Taiwan's Growing China Links,
Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly 13 (December 24, 1990).
85. Id.
86. Wakabayashi, 87 China Newsletter at 12 (cited in note 52).
87. Id at 13.
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The ban on direct. trade and investment also hurts the Taiwan busi-
ness community. Businesspeople say that making investment through
foreign subsidiaries and channeling trade through third countries add too
many expenses, delays and other problems. Until direct links are allowed,
many companies cannot afford to do business with the mainland.
D. Private vs. Public Exchanges
The enormous volume of business between Taiwan and the mainland
makes it imperative that ROC officials work out a framework with the
PRC. Yet such a comprehensive policy will probably never exist as long
as the ROC government insists upon banning "public" and "political"
contact, while tolerating "private" and "economic" relations. Such dis-
tinctions are clearly unrealistic.
For example, in March 1990, ROC officials announced that they
would begin preparations to resume sea and air traffic across the Taiwan
Strait.8" Once airline flights and ship crossings are started between Tai-
wan and mainland China, how can official discussions between the two
sides be avoided?
ROC officials themselves are trying to tacitly ignore rhetorical dis-
tinctions. For example, at the end of 1989, ROC and PRC officials met in
Hong Kong and signed an agreement establishing the "Taiwan-China
Commercial Affairs Cooperative Council.",89 This agreement was justi-
fied on the grounds that it was signed in Hong Kong and that a Chinese
businessman of American nationality acted as an intermediary. 90 As such
"private" agreements multiply, the need to negotiate will become more
compelling.
In fact, it appears that the distinction between "private" and "pub-
lic" has already been blurred by the establishment of the Foundation for
Exchanges Across the Strait, a "nongovemment" intermediary organiza-
tion founded to handle "technical matters" and to "provide protection or
help" to Taiwan businessmen. 91 In practice, this "private" organization
is a face-saving way to expedite contact between ROC and PRC officials.
The Foundation will receive at least half its funding from ROC govern-
88. Id.
89. Id. The complete text of the draft legislation is carried in Chung Kuo Shih Pao (Oct 10,
1989).
90. The ROC representative, Chang P'ing-cbao, a member both of the Legislative Yuan
and the KMT Central Committee, was reprimanded by KMT members on his return to Taiwan.
91. Interview with Ma Ying-jeou, Vice-Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council, in Amy
Lo, Imagination Linked With Decisiveness, Free China Review 26 (January 1991).
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ment sources and will be directly supervised by the Mainland Affairs
Council of the Executive Yuan.
It is unclear why Taiwan authorities insist on rhetorical distinctions
when it appears to be in Taiwan's interest to resolve pressing matters
through official negotiations, and when such distinctions will in time be
ignored anyway.
E. People-to-People Contacts
Taiwan's "people exchange" laws also contain provisions which seem
inconsistent with the ROC's stated intent of encouraging cultural, aca-
demic, and athletic exchange. For example, Clause 42 of the "Provisional
Articles on Relations Between the Peoples of Taiwan and the Mainland"
stipulates that all mainland residents who have ever belonged to the Com-
munist Party must declare this at their time of entry into Taiwan or else
face prosecution by Taiwan authorities.9 2 This device may soothe KMT
hardliners, but it contradicts the goal of increased people-to-people con-
tacts. Many intellectuals, artists, performers, athletes, scientists and
"important" persons from the mainland are CCP members. The very
idea of being prosecuted by Taiwan authorities on the basis of politics,
even if such a threat lacked credibility, will not be received graciously.
For example, after the Taiwan authorities lifted the ban on PRC reporters
visiting Taiwan, none of them applied to visit.9"
More importantly, such a position blatantly contradicts the ideal of
an open, democratic society. Taiwan has every reason to be proud of its
recent political development; it is now much more pluralistic, free, and
democratic than ever before. If Taiwan is to set a political example for
the mainland-and this is a clearly stated policy goal-the threat to pros-
ecute mainlanders on the basis of party membership is counterproductive.
IV. BATTLE FOR CHINESE MINDS
A. Marketplace of Ideas
In Taiwan moviehouses, nearly every film once began with an image
of Taiwan, a small yellow island, abutting a huge red mainland China.
The little island begins radiating yellow, pulsating rythmically as the
92. Provisional Articles on Relations Between the Peoples of Taiwan and the Mainland. 2
Current Compilation of Laws and Regulations of the ROC 672.
93. Hungdah Chiu, Recent Chinese Communist Policy Toward Taiwan and the Prospect for
Unification, 27 Issues & Studies 13, 22 note 28 (January 1991).
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ROC national anthem plays. Within seconds the huge red expanse is pen-
etrated by yellow pulses and starts turning yellow. By the end of the
anthem, the entire mainland has turned to yellow.
The ROC authorities have now formally abandoned the goal of tak-
ing over the mainland militarily. Instead, they have taken to the market-
place of ideas, where they are waging a campaign to influence the
socioeconomic and political development of the mainland by influencing
its students, intellectuals, and businesspeople. This position differs signifi-
cantly from pre-1987 policy and reflects a healthy optimism on the part of
ROC officials that mainland Chinese will be impressed with Taiwan and
will look upon it as a model for mainland China's own development. In a
sense, this thinking is a call to battle, a campaign to win the hearts and
minds of influential Chinese throughout the world.
This strategy is a new phenomonon, spawned by the exponential
pace of political reform since martial law was lifted in 1987. Without
such dramatic reform, ROC authorities would probably lack the credibil-
ity to influence mainland affairs. Prior to reform, Taiwan was viewed by
mainland Chinese as a KMT stronghold, envied for its wealth yet derided
for its totalitarianism, exploitation and greed. In the words of a promi-
nent mainland Chinese law professor: "For four decades, the KMT has
implemented and expanded special laws and regulations in order to main-
tain its single party dictatorship.., and resist political influence from the
mainland."94 Simply put, mainlanders associated Taiwan with the exploi-
tive, corrupt KMT which had fled mainland China forty years earlier.
This image was cultivated by PRC authorities, but it started to crum-
ble as the KMT implemented real political reform. By the late 1980's,
after travel restrictions had been loosened and hundreds of thousands of
Taiwan residents had traveled to the mainland, news of the "Taiwan mir-
acle" had spread. Some reports suggest that during the months which
preceded the Tiananmen democracy movement, the PRC had been swept
by "Taiwan fever." 95
The ROC authorities, for their part, base their new strategy on two
assumptions: (a) Dr. Sun Yat-sen's ideas, upon which the ROC Constitu-
tion is based, provide the most Chinese and most expedient ideology upon
which to base constitutional democracy; 96 and (b) the Chinese people, if
94. Zeng and Zheng, 3 J Chinese L at 206 (cited in note 2).
95. Hickey, 27 Issues & Studies at 44 (cited in note 63).
96. Sun Yat-sen's ideas are encapsulated in the San Min Zhu Yi [The Three Principles of
the People], which are: Nationalism, Democracy, and People's Livelihood. Sun's doctrine
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given the option, would choose a democratic, free-market system over
communism.
These assumptions underlie the five main principles which guide
ROC policy toward the mainland. The ROC has vowed to
(a) defend the Constitution of the ROC; (b) oppose Marxism
and Leninism; (c) maintain the security of the Taiwan area;
(d) support the struggle of mainland Chinese for freedom,
human rights, and the rule of law; and (e) accelerate the pace of
China's reunification under the principles of Sun Yat-sen.
97
Since these principles are general in nature and focus on ideology, they
provide room for the ROC government to use its imagination in following
their spirit.98
As a result, ROC policy has taken a subtle turn: There is now less
emphasis on sweeping ideological demands and more emphasis on pro-
positions acceptable to the Chinese masses. For example, ROC authori-
ties have in the past demanded that the CCP renounce the Four Cardinal
Principles.99 Such a demand, if accepted, would amount to capitulation,
and as such is unrealistic. ROC officials now reason (especially after the
Tiananmen Square massacre) that mainland Chinese would themselves, if
given the option, force the government to jettison these principles.
Consequently, the ROC now attempts to elevate freedom of speech
on the mainland through increased "people" exchange. The rationale is
that press freedom, academic freedom and artistic freedom will elicit
enthusiastic response from mainlanders, and, if successful, ultimately
force the CCP to relinquish authoritarian control. Thus, in June 1989,
immediately following the start of the Tiananmen demonstrations, ROC
officials initiated indirect telecommunications links across the Strait of
Taiwan and simplified mailing procedures for correspondence destined for
incorporates Western ideas of constitutional democracy with useful aspects of Confucian
political culture.
Richard Wilhelm, a contemporary of Sun Yat-sen and leading German translator of the
Chinese classics, wrote of Sun Yat-sen's thought:
The greatness of Sun Yat-sen rests upon the fact that he has found a living synthesis
between the fundamental principles of Confucianism and the demands of modem
times.... His intellectual work stands as a connecting bridge between the old and the
modem ages. Chu-yuan Cheng, ed, Sun Yat-sen's Doctrine in the Modern World ch 2
at 73 (Westview Press, 1989) ("Sun Yat-sen's Doctrine").
97. Interview with Ma Ying-jeou, Vice-Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council, in Lo,
Free China Review at 26 (cited in note 91).
98. Id at 27.
99. The Four Cardinal Principles are: (1) adherence to socialism, (2) dictatorship of the
proletariat, (3) leadership of the CCP, and (4) adherence to Marxist-Leninist-Maoist thought.
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the mainland."c° In addition, mainland Chinese noted for academic, cul-
tural and sports achievements may now visit Taiwan. 1
The ROC's ultimate goal clearly remains the overthrow of the
hardline Communist regime. But in propounding policy, ROC officials
are now careful to use terms acceptable to mainland Chinese. For exam-
ple, the stated purpose of the ROC's "Guidelines for National Unifica-
tion," approved by the National Reunification Council in February 1991,
is "to establish a democratic and free China with equal distribution of
social wealth among the people" (emphasis added). This last idea is not
characteristic of laissez-faire capitalism, but is a reminder that Dr. Sun
Yat-sen's thought contains egalitarian principles appropriate for main-
land China." 2
B. Reunification Is a Cornerstone
The campaign to influence the socioeconomic and political develop-
ment of mainland China is not just an ordinary policy goal. It draws life
from the idea, accepted by a majority of Chinese on both sides of the
Strait, that the reunification of Taiwan and the mainland is inevitable.
Mao Zedong used to say that it did not matter if Taiwan took a
hundred years to rejoin the motherland; he was certain that the two sides
would eventually reunite."0 3 Many people discount this assertion, regard-
ing unification as an imponderable which is too far in the future and thus
subject to the fickle winds of politics."° Yet both the ROC and PRC
consider it of fundamental importance and make decisions which pro-
100. Chronology-Pragmatic Adaptations, Free China Review 15 (Jan 1991).
101. Id.
102. Although Sun strongly believed in private enterprise, his doctrine rested upon land
reform and the nationalization of many basic industries. In formulating the Principle of People's
Livelihood (min-sheng), he seems to have incorporated the Confucian idea of economic and
social equality (chun). In 1919, arguing in favor of the min-sheng principle, Sun quoted a famous
saying of Confucius that a state should "worry not about poverty but about unequal distribution
(of wealth)." Sun Yat-sen's Doctrine ch 3 at 96 (cited in note 96).
Some ROC officials believe that the loss of the mainland was due not to mainland Chinese
support of Marxism, but rather the KMT's failure to uproot economic injustice and implement
Sun's min-sheng principle. Chiang Kai-shek told his followers in 1950: "Almost every comrade
knows that our failure in the anti-Communist struggle is due to our neglect of the min-sheng
principle in the mainland. Every comrade also knows that henceforth in our anti-Communist
struggle we must realize this principle through practical actions, not theoretical discussion."
Economic reform thereafter became one of the KMT's major policy goals. Annual Report of the
Republic of China (Chung Hua Min Kuo Nien Chien), 1950 123 (1951).
103. Andrew Nathan, China's Crisis: Dilemmas of Reform & Prospects for Democracy 154
(1990).
104. This attitude is very common among Western commentators, who see the "Taiwan
issue" from a typically short-term perspective.
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foundly influence internal and external affairs on the assumption the two
sides will indeed reunite.
Nevertheless, the prospect of unification has recently been challenged
by calls for independence from Taiwan opposition party members.
Although it is still formally illegal in Taiwan to espouse separation,
debate about the issue abounds, and thinly-disguised pleas for "self-deter-
mination" are regular occurrences.
The post-martial law era in Taiwan has thus witnessed an unprece-
dented airing of the once-suppressed view of Taiwan separation/indepen-
dence. The driving force behind this view is that during the past forty
years, political and economic bifurcations have created two separate soci-
eties across the Straits. Many Taiwan residents doubt that the two socie-
ties are compatible and have thus ceased to question when and how they
can get back to the mainland. Instead, they ask why there is a need to
return to the mainland at all. 105
It is important to note that Taiwan's political reform has changed an
important assumption on which the PRC's Taiwan policy has historically
been based. The CCP has assumed that the KMT is controlled by main-
landers committed to reunification and that it has the power to resolve the
fate of Taiwan. But democratization has so complicated the internal poli-
tics of Taiwan that it is now impossible to strike any "mainland deal" that
does not command wide popular support on the island. Control of the
KMT and of the island is tipping from mainlander to native Taiwanese
hands, from the elite to the electorate. Lee Tenghui, for example, is the
ROC's first native Taiwanese president.
In this light, it should be noted that the vast majority of Taiwan's
inhabitants have never stepped on mainland soil and do not necessarily
consider it their homeland. Given the antipathy of many native
Taiwanese (who comprise at least 85 percent of the populace) toward resi-
dent mainlanders, unification has never been a top priority. Indeed, many
native Taiwanese seem content with the status quo, de facto separation
from the mainland. Beijing officials firmly oppose de facto separation,
called "type B" independence by commentators, and have stepped up
calls for more open economic and cultural exchange.
Even among the KMT elite, democratization has taken its toll: the
hardline anti-communist stance which existed in the past appears to have
subsided, and there has been a shift away from the civil war mentality
105. Liu, 16 Asian Affairs at 136 (cited in note 6).
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that permeated the political sphere. This shift will be given further impe-
tus by the recent suspension of the Period of Mobilization in Suppression
of Communist Rebellion in April 1991. Now, Taiwan no longer considers
itself at war with the mainland. 106
Nonetheless, the most urgent concern at present is the threat of a
unilateral declaration of independence, or "type A" independence. Since
the 1989 elections, many newly-formed opposition parties have made pub-
lic calls for "self-determination." In November 1989, for example, a radi-
cal separatist organization called the "New Country Alliance" was
formed; its main purpose is to espouse separation from the mainland.° 7
The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the largest political opposition
group in Taiwan, has recently written the aim of separatism into the
party's bylaws.'1 8 And although it is still illegal to espouse independence,
officials have been reluctant to take decisive action. The Taiwan news
media frequently debates the issue under the guise of "self-
determination."
It would still be a mistake to discount the powerful force the idea of
reunification exerts on both sides of the Straits. Aside from the official
KMT allegiance to unification-which some skeptics regard as a delusion
founded on self-pride and political orthodoxy-there are inescapable rea-
sons why independence remains an unviable option for Taiwan. First,
Chinese nationality and culture are deeply rooted on the island. Con-
servative estimates date the incorporation of the Penghu islands (the Pes-
cadores) into the Chinese Empire by 1225. As for neighboring Taiwan,
massive settlement began after Koxinga expelled the Dutch from the
island (after 37 years of colonial rule) in 1661. In 1683, Taiwan came
under Ching rule, and in 1684 it was made a prefecture of Fukien (Fujian)
Province. This status lasted until 1885, when it was made a separate
province. In 1895, Taiwan was seized by Japan. 09
Most of the inhabitants of the island can trace their ancestry to
Fukien Province. According to a Japanese census taken in 1926, 83.1
percent of the Chinese population on Taiwan hailed from Fukien, 15.6
106. The Temporary Provisions were suspended principally to strip the President of his
extra-constitutional powers and implement constitutional government. Nonetheless, the
suspension formally abolishes the civil war between the two sides.
107. Chao, 26 Issues & Studies at 40 (cited in note 55).
108. Jeremy Mark and James MacGregor, Independence Movement in Taiwan Reflects
Broad Restiveness for Domestic Political Reform, Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly I (September
16, 1991).
109. See Yu.ming Shaw, Modern History of Taiwan: An Interpretive Account, in Hungdab
Chiu, ed, China and the Taiwan Issue ch 2 (Praeger Scientific, 1979).
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percent from Guangdong, and 1.3 percent from other Chinese prov-
inces.l"' The peoples of Taiwan and Fukien share a common language
(Taiwanese is nearly identical to a Fukienese dialect), similar religious
practices and beliefs, and similar family structures and kinship constella-
tions. 11" It is no coincidence that Fukien is such a popular destination for
Taiwan businesspeople.
These strong cultural ties alone are clearly insufficient to counter the
powerful socioeconomic and political incentives for separation. Instead,
they serve to legitimize a second, much more important factor: the threat
of mainland Chinese force. Previously, Deng Xiaoping set forth five con-
ditions under which the PRC would use force: (a) if Taiwan were invaded
by a foreign power; (b) if Taiwan developed nuclear weapons; (c) if Tai-
wan claimed independence; (d) if major internal chaos broke out on the
island; or (e) if Taiwan continued to refuse unification for "a long period
of time."" 2 According to recent reports, however, the PRC has tacitly
dropped all but two of these conditions: foreign invasion, or a unilateral
declaration of independence.'
13
Underlying this threat is the notion that Taiwan is historically and
culturally part of China, and no foreign power has the right to inter-
fere.' This idea is shared by an overwhelming percentage of Chinese.
Regardless of what the world opines, and what 20 million Taiwan resi-
dents may themselves decide, the PRC will not allow Taiwan to secede.
Moreover, the moral and humanitarian issues that might compel main-
land China to renounce military force do not (in the eyes of mainland
Chinese) outweigh its sovereign right to protect its soil. Mainland China
will not easily relinquish the idea that the Taiwan-Penghu-Kinmen-Matsu
islands are part of one China.
For this reason, both Taiwan's leadership and the electorate fear the
mainland military threat. Strategists have argued that mainland Chinese
military action would be difficult and costly. 15 Taiwan maintains a formi-
dable coastal defense system consisting of modern missiles, jet fighters
and electronic spotting devices." 6 Nonetheless, it is undisputed that if
110. Id at 15.
111. Liu, 16 Asian Affairs at 136 (cited in note 6).
112. John Quansheng Zhao, "One Country, Two Systems" and "One Country, Two
Parties" PRC-Taiwan Unification and its Political Implications, 2 Pac Rev 312, 313 (1989).
113. Chang Chen-pang, The Issue of China's Unification as Viewed from Both Sides, 27
Issues & Studies 5 (January 1991).
114. This last point is spelled out in every diplomatic agreement the PRC has signed.
115. Mark and MacGregor, Asian Wall Street Journal Weekly at 1 (cited in note 108).
116. Id.
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the mainland amassed troops and were ready to strike, martial law would
be proclaimed in Taiwan overnight, and every major democratic reform
implemented since 1987 would disappear.
Furthermore, the mainland has not hesitated to use this threat at
politically opportune moments. For example, at the end of 1989, when
DPP candidates began publicly calling for a "new nation" during an elec-
tion campaign, it was rumored that PRC officials had formed a task force
to study the feasibility of military reprisal. 1 7 In March 1990, during a
power struggle within the KMT party just before the presidential elec-
tions, the CCP-controlled Xinhua news agency openly came out in sup-
port of the conservative faction within the KMT, stating its belief that
"Taiwan's elected leader should be a person who will work for the reunifi-
cation of China."' 1 8 This announcement was immediately followed by
news leaks that China's military bases had been put on alert.
Since the Tiananmen Square massacre, many ROC officials and resi-
dents are further convinced that the PRC is willing to use force. This has
caused many separatists to "tone down" their calls for independence and
has reminded Taiwan residents that the future is not for them alone to
decide.
A third reason why independence is unlikely is that no major world
power would openly support it, since it would require breaking relations
with the PRC and would likely spur an international crisis. Taiwan has
been recognized as part of China in every formal diplomatic relations
agreement signed by the PRC. Nearly every major country and interna-
tional organization in the world recognizes that there is only one China
and that the "Taiwan question" is an internal matter for the Chinese
themselves to decide.
Clearly, both sides recognize that reunification will not be feasible in
the near future. Although there have been occasional calls for urgency,
ROC and PRC officials agree that in order for the two sides to integrate,
major political, social, cultural, and economic obstacles must first be sur-
mounted. This will take time, patience, and an enormous volume of
exchange. But the issue of whether Taiwan and the mainland will be
reunified--or, phrased differently, whether mainland China will allow
part of its territory to secede-is clear. As President Lee himself has said:
"Although development in the ROC over the past forty years has been
117. Chao, 26 Issues & Studies at 43 (cited in note 55).
118. Wakabayashi, 87 China Newsletter at 15 (cited in note 52).
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restricted to Taiwan, all plans have been conceived with the future of all
of China in mind. Taiwan and the mainland are indivisible parts of
China's territory, and all Chinese are compatriots of the same flesh and
blood." '119
CONCLUSION
Despite its anti-communist ideology, the ROC has adopted a more
pragmatic approach to its colossal neighbor. This approach is embodied
in a "noninterference" doctrine which allows Taiwan residents to engage
in private, unofficial dealings with mainland Chinese, but forbids official,
public contacts. Private exchange, however, has resulted in a need for
official cooperation with mainland Chinese authorities, especially in trans-
portation, communication, immigration, and financial matters. Yet such
cooperation has not been forthcoming, and the ROC has not signed any
official, substantive agreements with the PRC.
This ad hoc approach has caused friction between the ROC govern-
ment and the private sector. Since their government refuses to recognize
the legitimacy of the PRC, Taiwan residents who conduct business in the
mainland must incur considerable expense and risk. This has provoked
the ire of business leaders who have responded by pressuring the govern-
ment to side-step ideology and negotiate with CCP officials. The result
has been an ever-widening gap between the political interests of ROC offi-
cials and the economic interests of Taiwan industry.
The ROC has responded to the liberalization of relations with the
mainland by exploiting academic, cultural and economic exchange across
the Straits in an effort to convince mainlanders of the superiority of the
ROC system. Several years ago this strategy was unthinkable since most
mainland Chinese perceived Taiwan as a totalitarian KMT stronghold.
But now that the ROC Constitution has been reinstated,1 2 ° Taiwan resi-
dents are entitled to nearly every right and liberty common in Western
democracies.
This dramatic reform has given the Taipei government new legiti-
macy, and has prompted ROC officials to launch a propaganda campaign
119. President Lee Teng-hui, A New National Agenda, Free China Review 8 (July 1990)
(inaugural address).
120. The Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Mobilization to Suppress
Communist Rebellion, which labeled the CCP as "rebels" and gave the President extra-
constitutional powers (see text accompanying notes 15-24), were formally suspended by ROC
President Lee Teng-hui in May, 1991.
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to influence the economic and political development of the mainland.
This campaign is more than just an ordinary policy goal; it is vitalized by
the notion that mainland China and Taiwan are part of one China, and
that reunification is inevitable. It is also the ROC's last realistic hope
that it represents the future path of China.
